Authors
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
Publication date
2011/6/5
Book
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pages
81-90
Description
In sponsored search auctions, advertisers compete for a number of available advertisement slots of different quality. The auctioneer decides the allocation of advertisers to slots using bids provided by them. Since the advertisers may act strategically and submit their bids in order to maximize their individual objectives, such an auction naturally defines a strategic game among the advertisers. In order to quantify the efficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions, we study the corresponding games and present new bounds on their price of anarchy, improving the recent results of Paes Leme and Tardos [16] and Lucier and Paes Leme [13]. For the full information setting, we prove a surprisingly low upper bound of 1.282 on the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria. Given the existing lower bounds, this bound denotes that the number of advertisers has almost no impact on the price of anarchy. The …
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I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos… - Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic …, 2011